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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 
The dissertation is envisioned to be a comprehensive and systematic take on the 
matters of independence and impartiality of arbitrators in international arbitral 
proceedings on the one side and matters relating to independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators in arbitral proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) on 
the other side. Recent court decisions refusing enforceability of arbitral Awards of CAS 
have sent shockwaves through the international sports arbitration scene that have 
initiated a revision of CAS Statute. The goal of this dissertation is to explain and analyze 
the principles of independence and impartiality, the impact of procedural rules on the 
independence and impartiality of individual arbitrators and point out problematic 
matters for independence and impartiality of arbitrators in CAS arbitration. 
 
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter seeks to define 
independence and impartiality in international commercial arbitration from various 
arbitral and state court cases and the views of the legal profession. The second chapter 
pinpoints the importance of independence and impartiality in general and in sports 
arbitration. The third chapter is a brief overview of the history of CAS and its Rules. The 
fourth chapter is an elaboration on the present-day status of the CAS and court 
practice that is shining the light on the principles of independence and impartiality 
from a different perspective. 
 
Dr Friedrich Rosenfeld as the supervisor of this LL.M. dissertation made a contribution 
by virtue of his keen practical knowledge from arbitral proceedings and I am thankful 
for the opportunity to write my dissertation under his guidance and support. 
 
Keywords: International Commercial Arbitration, Court of Arbitration for Sports, CAS, 
Independence, Impartiality. 
 
Vladimir Konstantinidis 
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1. Introduction 
This dissertation addresses the following topic „Independence and Impartiality 
of Arbitrators in the Court of Arbitration for Sport”. Part 1 examines the obligation of 
independence and impartiality in international commercial arbitration from various 
arbitral and court proceedings and from the views of the legal profession because it is 
an obligation bestowed upon every arbitrator by numerous laws and rules (see p. 3.).1  
 
Part 2 explains the importance of independence and impartiality in general and in 
sports arbitration as it is widely acknowledged that the selection of an arbitrator by the 
parties is one of the most crucial decisions which one has to make (see p. 13.).  
 
Part 3 is consisted of a brief overview of the history of CAS and its rules which are 
necessary for understanding the current status of CAS (see p. 17.).  
 
Part 4 focuses on the present-day status of CAS as the leading institution in the world in 
resolving sports related disputes and the current case law that is shining the light on 
independence and impartiality from a different perspective (see p. 21.).  
 
The conclusion drawn is that there is no significant difference that sports arbitration 
has in regards to commercial arbitration because different outcomes in recent cases 
are attributed to an institutional and structural matter of CAS as an institution and not 
to the individual arbitrators in question (see p. 31.). 
 
 
                                                 
1
See, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, amendments 2006 art 12 (1-
2); ICC Rules of Arbitration 2017 art 11 (1); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2013 art 11; CAS Code of Sports-
related Arbitration 2019 art R33; IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 1987 art 3.1; See also, 
Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012) 135-136. 
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2. Independence and impartiality of arbitrators 
Arbitration proceedings have become one of the most used alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms globally and businesses worldwide are aware of the benefits 
that arbitration could have over State court proceedings. Independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators in arbitration proceedings have been a topic of great 
discussion during the past two decades due to the fact that a small number of 
professionals practice as arbitrators on a regular basis and due to the fact that major 
law firms and businesses carry the majority of international arbitration cases which 
could have a detrimental effect on key principles that regulate dispute resolution and 
could possibly lead to avoidance of arbitration by smaller businesses.  
 
2.1. Overview of independence and impartiality 
 
Historically speaking, it was acknowledged a long time ago that certain 
procedural rights of due process are guaranteed to an individual when he is a subject 
of criminal and other court proceedings, even before modern institutional legal 
frameworks were created, beginning with the Magna Carta in England in the thirteenth 
century and spanning to The Declaration of the Rights of Man in France.2 Arbitral 
proceedings are also widely considered to guarantee due process to every individual 
party to a dispute, with the core principles being every party’s right to be treated fairly 
and equally, to be given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case and for the 
tribunal to be impartial.3 Unlike court proceedings, arbitral proceedings are envisioned 
as more flexible and do not contain rules which would regulate in detail each principle 
of due process. This is why international arbitrators have the authority to interpret the 
rules on a case-by-case basis with the risk of having their arbitral Award refused 
recognition and enforcement if the procedural rights of a party were violated. 
However, one of the core principles of arbitration, the principles of independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators are the most important safe keepers of the lawfulness of the 
arbitral proceeding, recognized at the earliest phases of history such as in ancient 
Greece where the word for “arbitrator“ was synonymous with impartiality.4  
 
The maxim nemo judex in sua causa is a goal that the principles of independence and 
impartiality seek to accomplish. The arbitrator’s duties to resolve a dispute and issue a 
final and binding arbitral Award are inherent with his duty to be independent and 
impartial because he assumes an adjudicatory role. The existence of which 
circumstances deem an arbitrator dependent on one of the parties or which 
circumstances make an arbitrator biased could vary on a case by case basis. Ultimately 
the end result is the same whether the arbitrator in question (member of the panel or 
                                                 
2
 Charles Nairac, Due Process Considerations in the Constitution of Arbitral Tribunals, (ed  Andrea 
Menaker (International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution and Conformity, ICCA Congress 
Series, Volume 19, ICCA & Kluwer Law International 2017) 121-122. 
3
 Ibid; UNCITRAL Model Law International Commercial Arbitration 1985, amendments 2006 art 18. 
4
 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 1761. 
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presiding) was dependent on a party or biased, there is the serious threat of a court 
denying recognition and enforcement of that arbitral Award on the grounds related to 
the arbitral procedure being unlawful.5 Many legal systems provide for multiple 
grounds for the annulment of an arbitral Award, with most of them echoing the 
grounds for the refusal of recognition and enforcement in the New York Convention 
article V.6 The possible legal grounds in the New York Convention that could relate to 
the violation of the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator are three: Article 
V(1)(b) New York Convention- the inability to present ones case as a consequence of 
an arbitrator being biased or dependent; Article V(1)(d)- the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal which is contrary to the parties agreement and Article V(2)(b)-public 
policy.7 
 
In recent years the trust in arbitration has begun to decline the most in developing 
countries that look at arbitration as a biased dispute resolution system.8 This trend 
poses a threat to arbitration expanding as dispute resolution procedure for the less 
wealthy countries and businesses. 
 
In order to prudentially analyze the meanings of independence and impartiality, the 
available case law and the significance of these principles in all arbitral proceedings, 
which is the main goal of this chapter, it is imperative to firstly address the duty of 
disclosure of potential arbitrators because of its significance in the pre-arbitration 
phase. After defining an arbitrator’s duty to disclose we will define independence and 
impartiality according to the relevant legal instruments, international sources and 
leading cases. Lastly, we will touch upon third party funding as a new phenomenon in 
international arbitration proceedings for a comprehensive overview of independence 
and impartiality. 
 
2.2. Duty to disclose 
 
At the beginning of the arbitral proceedings when a future arbitrator is 
approached for the purpose of resolving a dispute, an obligation for disclosure is 
activated. This obligation of disclosure is required by many institutional arbitration 
rules urging the possible arbitrator to address his independence and impartiality at the 
earliest stage and disclose to the parties any circumstances that likely give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his independence and impartiality and without delay.9 In order 
to avoid any possible risk of being challenged in the future for the violation of the 
                                                 
5
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 art 5 (1)(d). 
6
 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 3164. 
7
 Katia Fach Gomez and Ana M. Lopez-Rodriguez (eds), 60 Years of the New York Convention: Key Issues 
and Future Challenges (Kluwer Law International 2019) 138-143. 
8
 In the last five years three states have denounced the ICSID Convention: Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela; See also Tony Cole, The Roles of Psychology in International Arbitration (International 
Arbitration Law Library, Volume 40, Kluwer Law International 2017) 340-341. 
9
 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, amendments 2006 art 12 (1) 
“a person shall disclose any circumstances that likely gives rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
independence and impartiality.“ 
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principles of independence and impartiality arbitrators should reveal all facts which 
may reasonably be considered grounds for disqualification.10 The duty of disclosure is 
an obligation that is common in all arbitral proceedings which no prospective 
arbitrator can avoid.11 
 
In past years parties were unwilling to challenge an arbitrator even in cases where his 
independence was reasonably shaken. If a vacancy did occur it was due to the death of 
an arbitrator or a resignation, however in recent years parties do not hold back to 
challenge an arbitrator’s independence and/or impartiality, sometimes even as a 
means of guerrilla tactics making things difficult for the arbitral tribunal or to the other 
party in the proceeding.12 This could happen at the beginning of the arbitral 
proceeding in order to disrupt the creation of the arbitral tribunal or during the 
proceedings if a party wants to impose pressure on an arbitrator for him to vote in the 
parties favour on the merits of the case. 
 
In practice a prospective arbitrator discloses all information that he deems relevant in 
an informal way during the first contact with the party seeking to nominate him, this is 
usually done when the parties interview an individual that they seek to nominate as 
their party nominated arbitrator. Later, if nominated, the arbitrator submits all 
relevant information in writing to both of the parties to the dispute giving the 
counterparty all relevant information in order to assess his independence and 
impartiality and possibly challenge it. 
 
2.3. Independence: Definitions and case law 
 
After an arbitrator acts according to his duty to disclose relevant information 
the next step is ascertaining whether or not certain facts exist that pose or could pose 
a threat to his independence or impartiality. An arbitrator is independent when he has 
no financial interest in the case or in the outcome of the case.13 Independence also 
means that the arbitrator is objectively independent of the parties in the dispute, e.g. 
that he is not an employee of one of the parties or in a professional relationship with 
one of the parties.14 The purpose of the independence requirement is to ensure that 
there are no connections and relations between the party and the arbitrator in order 
to prevent compromising the arbitrator.  
 
The obligation of independence is regarded as unnecessary in some states. This is the 
case in the UK, where the obligation of independence was left out of the English 
                                                 
10
 Blackaby Nigel and Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) para 4.79. 
11
 ICC Rules of Arbitration 2017 art 11 (2)(3); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2013 art 11; LCIA Arbitration 
Rules art 5.4. 
12
 Blackaby Nigel and Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) paras 4.89-4.90. 
13
 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012) 135. 
14
 Ibid. 
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Arbitration Act of 1996 because the drafters came to the conclusion that the lack of 
independence of an arbitrator is of no significance unless it gives rise to justifiable 
doubts to his impartiality.15 This, however, does not mean that independence is not 
covered by the English Law at all because it is contained in the principle of impartiality. 
Impartiality can be proven only through objective facts, which means that an objective 
fact needs to exist in order to prove that an arbitrator is being biased and that fact is 
linked to the arbitrator. The arbitrator could be linked to a party only through the 
existence of facts such as private dealings of an arbitrator with a party or his 
continuous professional relationship with a party that gives rise to an unacceptable 
risk that the arbitrator will be biased. Practically, this means that firstly it is necessary 
to prove the existence of objective circumstances that by definition are facts that 
deem an arbitrator dependent on the parties and then weigh out the impact of these 
facts to the impartiality of an arbitrator. This process needs to be carried out in order 
for an arbitrator to be deemed partial under the English Arbitration Act of 1996. This 
uncommon rule of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 could be beneficial to arbitral 
proceedings because it gives flexibility to the court in deciding when an arbitrator’s 
impartiality is challenged. It gives room for a court to decide contrary to the common 
practice where even when there are certain connections between an arbitrator and a 
party to a dispute that these connections may not be of such significance on his 
impartiality so as to dismiss that individual from being an arbitrator. Especially 
considering that most arbitrators are chosen by virtue of their personal reputation and 
morality which assumes that they are aware of any dangers to their integrity and 
accepted an appointment in good faith. 
 
The Swiss PILA, on the other hand, requires arbitrators to be independent and is silent 
on the principle of impartiality which is directly opposite to the English Arbitration Act 
of 1996.16 The Swiss Federal Tribunal as the competent national court of Switzerland 
has determined that there is no distinction between the two terms – independence 
and impartiality.17 
 
Arbitrators need to pay attention to every detail about their previous professional and 
personal engagements and disclose information that may be relevant to their 
independence and impartiality. Even if potential arbitrators disclose all information 
each party still has the right to challenge an arbitrator under the rules of the 
proceedings. The majority of available decisions on the challenges to arbitrators are 
from institutional arbitrations because many of them provide a procedure for 
challenging independence and impartiality of arbitrators. When the decisions of such 
institutional arbitrations are made public they can be used in order to help in similar 
situations in other cases, which could be greatly beneficial to legal certainty.  
 
The new wave of challenges to the independence and impartiality of arbitrators, a 
large percent of which are used merely as a procedural tactic, have forced institutions 
to review the traditional practice that the decisions on the challenges of independence 
                                                 
15
 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 1776. 
16
 Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law 1987 (Swiss), art 180, para 1, subpara c). 
17
 Despina Mavromati, Mathieu Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases 
and Materials (Kluwer Law International 2015) 136. 
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of arbitrators are confidential and started publishing the redacted challenge decisions 
in order to clarify to the arbitrators the necessary facts they must disclose, and sway 
the parties away from challenging when they can assume it will be rejected by the 
institution (the first institutional arbitration to begin this practice is the LCIA).18 
 
Public and available case law from numerous institutional arbitrations provides us with 
examples of successful and unsuccessful challenges of arbitrators. A case before the 
English High Court dealt with the issue when a manager of a party to a dispute 
nominated himself as an arbitrator for the arbitral proceeding, which is obviously a 
case where the independence of an arbitrator is compromised (see p. 9).19 The 
manager was removed from the case as an arbitrator according to the English 
Arbitration Act of 1950.20 In one case before the Danish Institute of Arbitration (DIA) a 
challenge to the independence of an arbitrator was raised based on the fact that the 
arbitrator was a member of the board of a company during the same time as the 
claimant’s current manager.21 This challenge was rejected because previous 
membership on the same board prior to the arbitral proceedings does not raise 
justifiable doubts about the independence of the arbitrator.22 In another case before 
the DIA an arbitrator was disqualified because he had professional ties with the 
claimant, he was a director and manager in a company that was half-owned by one of 
the claimants co-owners and managers and the Committee of DIA concluded that 
these circumstances give justifiable doubts to the independence of the arbitrator in 
question, ascertaining that an important part of their conclusion is that these 
circumstances still existed during the time the dispute took place unlike the previous 
case when the challenge was rejected.23  
 
2.4. Impartiality: Definitions and case law 
 
Impartiality commonly means that the arbitrator is not biased, that he is not 
already subjectively invested in the dispute by having a preconceived notion regarding 
the issues in the case and that he does not favour one of the parties to the detriment 
of the other.24 Impartiality is, therefore, a subjective concept and, unlike 
independence, more difficult to prove as it is essentially a state of mind.25 Unlike 
independence that is focused on the relationship between the arbitrator and the 
                                                 
18
 Blackaby Nigel and Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) para 4.91. 
19
 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 
716-718. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See Steffen Pihlblad and Johan Tufte-Kristensen, Challenge Decisions at the Danish Institute of 
Arbitration, (Journal of International Arbitration, Volume 33, Issue 6, Kluwer Law International 2016) 
604-605. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid 602-603. 
24
 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012) 134-135. 
25
 Blackaby Nigel and Constantine Partasides , et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 
(6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) para 4.78. 
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parties, impartiality is focused on the relationship between the arbitrator and the 
matters of the case.26 Impartiality is quite certainly impossible to establish for 
outsiders given that it is a state of mind of the arbitrator, therefore requiring a party to 
prove impartiality with a high degree of certainty would be illusory and impossible 
given that proof of actual bias is very difficult to obtain.27  
 
Impartiality of arbitrators is crucial for arbitration. Some authors even go so far as to 
state that independence is less relevant than impartiality and that different 
jurisdictions may choose not to introduce independence in their national laws, unlike 
impartiality which is crucial.28 English case law provided for a formula for calculating 
whether an individual is apparently being biased. The test was first used by the English 
House of Lords in the Porter v. Magill case when Ms Shirley Porter (a politician of the 
Conservative party) appealed a decision of a lower court stating that an auditor in the 
case was apparently being biased, namely the test consists of the question what an 
informed and fair-minded observer would conclude given the facts of the case.29 Even 
though this test was first used in litigation, the test of what an informed and fair-
minded observer would conclude when informed of the facts of the case has been 
effectively used for arbitral proceedings in determining impartiality, especially if a 
motion was made to a Court for the annulment of an arbitral Award.30 This formula 
has also been recognized by other jurisdictions. The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration from 2014 (IBA Guidelines) recognizes this formula 
explicitly in its General Standard 2 (b). The courts in the US, on the other hand, have a 
different standard for bias from their colleagues in the UK and even have different 
standards between themselves. The US Second Circuit Court requires ‘evident 
partiality’, meanwhile the Ninth Circuit Court requires a lower standard of ‘an 
impression of possible bias’.31 
 
Case law of eminent institutional arbitrations provides with examples of violations of 
impartiality on the part of arbitrators. In one case before the DIA an arbitrator was 
disqualified by the Committee of DIA which believed that his impartiality would be 
hindered because there was the possibility that a regular client of his law firm will join 
the case, even though the current situation in the case allowed him to be an 
arbitrator.32 Another case involved an arbitrator and a member of the party’s counsel 
that owned a hunting consortium together, none of the parties challenged the 
arbitrator, however, the DIA Committee initiated sua sponte the evaluation of his 
                                                 
26
 Alfonso Gomez-Acebo, Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration 
(International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 34, Kluwer Law International 2016) paras 4-12. 
27
 Karel Daele, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Arbitration, (International 
Arbitration Law Library, Volume 24, Kluwer Law International 2012) 237. 
28
 Franz T. Schwarz and Christian W. Konrad, The Vienna Rules: A Commentary on International 
Arbitration in Austria (Kluwer Law International 2009) para 7-096. 
29
 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 
726. 
30
 See ASM Shipping Ltd. of India v. TIMI Ltd. of England, [2005] EWHC 2238 para 39. 
31
 See Tony Cole, The Roles of Psychology in International Arbitration (International Arbitration Law 
Library, Volume 40, Kluwer Law International 2017) 345-346. 
32
 Steffen Pihlblad and Johan Tufte-Kristensen, Challenge Decisions at the Danish Institute of Arbitration, 
(Journal of International Arbitration, Volume 33, Issue 6, Kluwer Law International 2016) 611-612. 
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impartiality and disqualified the arbitrator.33 Such case law is greatly beneficial to the 
creation of common standards for challenging and disqualifying arbitrators in 
international arbitration proceedings. 
 
2.5. IBA Guidelines 
 
In attempting to deal with the issues of independence and impartiality the 
International Bar Association formed a Working Group that created an important legal 
instrument for international arbitration, the IBA Guidelines for the Conflicts of Interest 
in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines). The IBA Guidelines are not a binding legal 
instrument (unless the parties agree contrary) but given the fact that the Guidelines 
contain and promote the best practice in international arbitration, the majority of 
arbitrators follow the recommendations. The IBA Guidelines apply equally to all 
arbitrators, whether a sole arbitrator in the dispute, a presiding arbitrator or an 
appointed arbitrator.34 IBA had previously issued the IBA Rules of Ethics for Arbitrators 
in 1987 (IBA Rules) that regulate matters such as disclosure, independence and 
impartiality, which is why the IBA Guidelines explicitly proclaim that the matters in the 
IBA Rules are still in effect, except the matters overlapping with the matters in the IBA 
Guidelines, which are superseded.35 
 
The IBA Guidelines consist of two parts. Part One is consisted of 7 General Standards 
dealing with conflicts of interest, duties of disclosure and waivers, while Part Two 
provides examples on how the General Standards in Part One should be applied 
through specified situations.36  
 
These situations are divided into three lists: Red List (Nonwaivable and Waivable), 
Orange List and Green List. The Red List contains nonwaivable situations where the 
parties in the dispute even if they wish cannot waive their challenge to the 
independence or impartiality of an arbitrator and the arbitrator must not accept the 
case because the facts could greatly influence the arbitrator while deciding on the 
merits of the case, e.g. the arbitrator is a manager in one of the parties.37 The Red List 
also contains waivable situations which are by their content borderline situations 
which parties may waive if they wish, e.g. the arbitrator had prior involvement in the 
dispute.38 The Orange list, on the other hand, consists of scenarios that the arbitrator 
needs to disclose and if the parties do not challenge the arbitrator after the disclosure, 
it can be considered that they waived the right to object.39 Finally, the Green List 
consists of examples where no obligation of disclosure exists, the Working Group 
believed such situations do not raise questions of independence and impartiality, e.g. 
                                                 
33
 Ibid 614. 
34
 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 2014, General Standard 7. 
35
 Ibid, Introduction to the Guidelines, para 8. 
36
 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012) 137-138. 
37
 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 2014, Part II, para1.2. 
38
 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 2014, Part II, para 2.1.2. 
39
 Ibid para 6. 
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the arbitrator and counsel of one of the parties have previously served together as 
arbitrators.40 
 
The importance of the IBA guidelines is proven by the arbitration practice after its 
adoption, with the arbitration community profiting the most out of them. Regarding 
national courts, on the other hand, the practice is different, and the arbitration 
community needs to be aware that some of the courts may give the IBA Guidelines 
relevance, but others may not.41 The Guidelines help any individual when approached 
to be an arbitrator when he is uncertain whether to disclose some information or not, 
however, any potential arbitrator needs to be aware that too much disclosure can be a 
favour for the abusive party, which could see it as an opportunity for its guerrilla 
tactics. The IBA Guidelines contain explanations of matters that have in recent years 
posed a problematical topic for independence and impartiality in international 
arbitration such as third party funding. 
  
2.6. Waivers 
 
Party autonomy is a principle that defines international arbitration. Party 
autonomy in international arbitration means that the parties have the possibility, 
albeit to a certain extent, to construct the arbitral proceedings as they wish, they can 
choose to settle their dispute by an ad hoc arbitration or institutional arbitration, 
decide the number of arbitrators, the applicable law and etc.  
 
Party autonomy also means that the parties can decide not to exercise their rights and 
they can even waive the exercise of certain rights for the future. However, the parties 
do not have the absolute freedom to waive the right in challenging an arbitrator. The 
Nonwaivable Red List of the IBA Guidelines consists of situations where a party’s 
waiver is invalid and does not have a legal effect because of the crucial impact of the 
circumstances covered there on the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator.42 
Some institutional arbitrations such as DIA have the power to start the procedure of 
disqualification of an arbitrator sua sponte, even if no challenge was made by the 
parties, thereby enforcing the idea that the minimum standard of independence and 
impartiality as a fundamental feature of arbitration must be preserved even if the 
parties do not wish to challenge it, or they simply are passive.43  
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Ibid para 4.4.2; See also Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 136-141. 
41
 Ibid 141. 
42
 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 2014, General Standard 4 (b). 
43
 DIA Rules of Arbitration 2013, art 13 (4). 
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2.7. Third party funding 
 
In the modern arbitral community, opinions are divided on the matter of third 
party funding and its consequences on the principles and duties of independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators. Third party funding is a growing issue that is receiving 
attention globally due to the problematic characteristics of the endeavour which could 
possibly have detrimental effects on the arbitral proceeding and which calls for new 
policy considerations. 
 
”Good arbitration costs a good deal of money.”44 
 
International arbitration is an expensive endeavour for many businesses that seek to 
use its conveniences to their benefit. In order to get capital for the arbitration costs, 
businesses obtain financing from funding companies (funders) that wish to profit from 
the proceeds if the case is won.  
 
Unlike third party funding of litigation costs, the funding of arbitration expenses is a 
recent phenomenon. Third party funding in arbitral proceedings poses multiple 
problems (the artificial inflation of the claim, the discontinuance of the arbitral 
proceedings etc.), one of which is its impact on independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators. Namely, the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator could be 
shaken if the funding of a claim was secured by a funding institution that has multiple 
cases in its portfolio.  
 
There could be an interconnection between two claims - arbitrator A is appointed by a 
claimant who is funded by a funder in one case and in another case arbitrator A is a 
counsel of a party that is funded by the same funder.45 The arbitrator A may be prone 
to decide in favour of the claimant in the first case. The level of disclosure of 
arbitrators is also important to determine. The funding contract between the claimant 
and the funder may be confidential in which case arbitrator A may be at a conflict 
between two obligations, the duty to disclose information and the confidentiality 
obligation with the funder and his client. 
 
Third party funders are defined broadly in the IBA Guidelines: 
 
“[…] any person or entity that is contributing funds, or other material 
support, to the prosecution or defence of the case and that has a direct 
economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be 
rendered in the arbitration”.46 
 
Investment arbitration is the most attractive for claimants and funders out of all types 
of arbitral proceedings (such as private commercial arbitration proceedings) due to 
                                                 
44
 Jonas von Goeler, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration and its Impact on Procedure 
(International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 35, Kluwer Law International 2016) 1. 
45
 Ibid 253. 
46
 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 2014, Explanation to General 
Standard 6 (b). 
  -12- 
high costs of investment arbitration proceedings, the high value of investments, 
lengthy proceedings, the recent global financial crisis and the relative transparency of 
investment arbitral Awards which funders use to estimate risk and decide whether to 
credit a party or not.47 Another important reason why claimants seek funding for their 
claim is that they want to shift the risk of the negative outcome of the dispute to 
someone else.48 Thus, third party funding may provide positive incentives to a claimant 
in pursuing the case when his financial status does not allow it, thereby providing clear 
advantages and positive results for accessing justice. 
 
For preserving the independence and impartiality of arbitrators as regards to third 
party funding it is imperative to define clear rules of disclosure for arbitrators. The 
significance of the arbitrators duty to inform the parties of possible conflicts of 
interest, and by that providing them the possibility in challenging the arbitrator, is 
emphasized by the fact that the arbitral Award can be annulled or denied recognition 
and enforcement if the relationship between the arbitrator and the funder would be 
unveiled after the arbitral proceedings have ended. It would appear as if the arbitrator 
purposely failed to disclose the relationship, and this appearance of dependence and 
partiality is enough to challenge the arbitral Award.49  
                                                 
47
 Eric De Brabandere and Julia Lepeltak, ‘Third Party Funding in International Investment Arbitration’ 
[2012] 6 available at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2078358> or < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2078358> accessed at 12
th
 August 2019. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Blackaby Nigel and Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) para 4.134. 
  -13- 
3. The importance of independence and impartiality in general 
commercial arbitration and sports arbitration  
Similar procedural rules and procedural solutions exist regarding the status and 
duties of an arbitrator in general commercial arbitration and sports arbitration, more 
concretely CAS arbitration. This is why this subsection focuses on outlining the 
common procedural rules of Europe’s established institutional arbitrations in 
commercial matters on the one hand and outlining the procedural rules of CAS 
arbitration on the other hand. 
 
3.1. General commercial arbitration 
 
The contractual duties of an arbitrator vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
because of the different obligations of an arbitrator in regards to the party that 
nominated him. Such differences are based on the various roles an arbitrator could 
have that could span from an arbitrator-advocate of the party that nominated him or a 
non-neutral arbitrator (both of which are allowed to be inclined to the party that 
nominated them) to an arbitrator that needs to be free from any obligations to the 
party that nominated him. Also, the parties themselves can specify in the arbitration 
agreement what is the content of the obligation of independence and impartiality and 
define if an arbitrator can be predisposed to the party that nominated him.50  
 
However, when the parties agree to submit their dispute to an institutional arbitration, 
the rules of that institution may differ from what the parties agreed, especially if the 
parties agree that the arbitrators have a status such as an arbitrator-advocate, 
unfamiliar with the majority of institutional arbitrations in Europe. The conflict 
between the parties’ agreement and the procedural rules of the specific arbitration 
institution is usually resolved to the benefit of the latter because the rules of 
procedure of most of the arbitration institutions provide that their rules apply in 
matters regulated by them e.g. ICC Rules of Arbitration art. 19. The effects of a 
violation of independence and impartiality on the part of one of the arbitrators may 
have negative consequences on the rest of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral Award. 
Such an issue may arise regarding the validity of the arbitral Award, if only one of the 
arbitrators was partial, unlike the other two, who were impartial.  
 
If an action for annulment is to be filed on the basis of only one arbitrator being 
biased, the court could use the ”mathematical approach” and decide that one 
arbitrator’s partiality is not enough to annul the arbitral Award, especially if the other 
two members of the tribunal were impartial.51 However, this sort of logic is not 
persuasive because arbitrators are not like machines that follow pure logic, arbitration 
is a process of discussion and argumentation during which there is no way of 
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separating the influences of one of the arbitrators (the biased one) on the rest of the 
members of the tribunal.52 The influence could be significant if the individual in 
question is of great authority in the particular field of law and any argument of that 
individual would be of great weight to the other arbitrators. That is why the principles 
of independence and impartiality are significant in all arbitral proceedings. 
 
Another important question is the significance of the moment in time when 
challenging an arbitrator’s independence and impartiality. The decision on an 
arbitrator’s independence and impartiality may vary if it is rendered at the beginning 
of the arbitral proceeding by way of an institutional challenge submitted to the 
administration of the institutional arbitration or if the decision is rendered by a 
national court after the end of the arbitral proceeding by a motion to annul the arbitral 
Award on the same grounds. Practice has shown that there is a larger probability of 
disqualifying an arbitrator when the challenge is submitted at the beginning of the 
arbitral proceedings than with a motion to a national court, one of the main reasons 
being that courts are unwilling to annul an arbitral Award that had reached an 
appropriate result, after time-consuming and expensive arbitral proceedings.53 
 
3.2. The importance of independence and impartiality in sports arbitration 
 
The Court of Arbitration for Sport is the single and most significant institution 
for solving sports related disputes. Such a status CAS has established gradually through 
the years since its formation (see p. 17) while at the same time consistently developing 
trust in its authority and competence. 
  
As a leading institution for solving sports related disputes the importance of 
independence and impartiality in sports arbitration will be outlined according to CAS 
rules for independence and impartiality in its CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 
2019. The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 proclaims a general obligation 
of independence and impartiality on its arbitrators in article R33 while also indirectly 
referencing independence and impartiality in other parts of the Code such as in article 
S18 which prohibits arbitrators to act as counsel for a party before CAS.54 Therefore, 
the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 does not allow an arbitrator to act as 
an arbitrator-advocate for the party that nominated him and every other agreement of 
the parties in the arbitration agreement would be contrary to those procedural rules 
which govern the arbitration procedure and would be denied legal force. 
 
Such as in English case law which provided for a formula for calculating whether an 
individual is apparently being biased, the test of what an informed and fair-minded 
observer would conclude when informed of the facts of the case (see Independence 
and impartiality of arbitrators - Impartiality p. 7) is what article R34 of the CAS Code of 
Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 also provides for the assessment of an arbitrator’s 
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independence and impartiality.55 The independence and impartiality of an arbitrator 
should therefore not be challenged through the subjective perception of the parties 
but rather by the perception of an informed and fair-minded observer.56  
 
Article R34 of the CAS Code, on the one hand, provides the possibility for an arbitrator 
to be deemed biased if facts exist that give rise to serious doubt even if the arbitrator 
is not actually being biased and, on the other hand, provides that in order for 
successfully challenging an arbitrator one must pose concrete evidence that 
objectively gives rise to serious doubts of the arbitrator’s independence and 
impartiality. The rule will discourage the abusive parties which seek to challenge an 
arbitrator as a part of their guerrilla tactics. Thus, e.g. merely stating that an arbitrator 
is an „institutional“ arbitrator to the benefit of doping bodies is a personal opinion and 
is not enough to remove an arbitrator from a panel without any other existing facts.57 
 
The history of CAS from its formation as an institution to its modern-day status has 
been influenced by the desire to be recognized as an independent and impartial 
arbitration court and the development of its procedural rules have evolved with the 
specific goal of creating a faith in its arbitrators and its organizational independence 
from sporting associations as a precondition for a lawful arbitral Award. In order to 
adequately understand the problems an arbitrator could face regarding his 
independence and impartiality when acting in CAS arbitration one must understand 
the structural, organizational and procedural rules of CAS, CAS’s award history and the 
case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal.  
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4. The statutory organization of CAS and the rules of procedure 
This subsection is aimed at providing a brief history of CAS with an explanation 
of early problems that CAS had regarding its status as a court of arbitration after which 
a reform was initiated with the goal of removing any risks to CAS’s independence and 
impartiality. This subsection also reflects on the status of CAS after the reform of its 
CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration and ends with the analysis of CAS’s procedural 
rules. 
4.1. The History of CAS 
 
The second half of the 20th century proved to be the most prosperous period 
for the development of industries and science in human history. As new technology 
created cultural and social changes in everyone’s life, sport benefited the most out of 
possibilities of wide media coverage and became an industry with great investments 
and specific legal issues that needed to be dealt with efficiently and expeditiously. 
 
During the ‘80s there was a need for resolving sport related issues on an international 
level by an international body that could deal with legal matters relating to sports in a 
speedy and cost-effective manner.58 The work on the Statute of CAS began once a 
working group was established by the International Olympic Committee comprising 
three members and the IOC officially ratified the Statute of CAS in 1983 which entered 
into force a year later on the 30th of June 1984 with the first arbitral Award being 
rendered in 1987.59  The first cases that were brought to CAS were relating to contracts 
and damages, sponsorships and doping cases. The IOC has had a pivotal role in 
assembling and funding CAS which would in the early 90’s pose as a problem. A 
judgement by the Swiss Federal Tribunal pointed out that CAS is too connected 
financially and organizationally to the IOC and it would be questionable if CAS would 
be considered an arbitral tribunal at all if a party to the dispute was the IOC.60  
 
4.2. The independence of CAS before its reform 
 
In order for CAS to have jurisdiction in a sports-related dispute, the parties 
need to agree to submit their dispute to CAS. CAS has two main proceedings, an 
ordinary arbitration proceeding and an appeal proceeding. An arbitration agreement 
between the parties might be an arbitration clause in a contract, or a separate 
provision in a statute of a sporting association (ordinary arbitration proceedings) or in 
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the case of an appeal arbitration proceeding, the decision against which the appeal is 
submitted must be made by a sporting federation which regulations or statutes allow 
an appeal or the parties concluded a specific agreement.61  
 
The Statute of the International Equestrian Federation (FEI) was the first to contain an 
arbitration clause for appealing the decisions issued by its Judicial Committee and was 
the first attempt for setting aside a CAS award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
(SFT).62 Elmar Gundel was an equestrian suspended for three months from all 
international equestrian competitions for doping his horse.63 Unsatisfied with the 
decision of the Judicial Committee of FEI he submitted a public appeal to the SFT and 
contested the award and requested its annulment on the grounds that it was rendered 
by a court not established on the principles of independence and impartiality which is 
necessary in order to be considered a proper arbitration court. The SFT rejected the 
appeal confirming that the CAS is a true court of arbitration.  
 
However, it gave attention to, inter alia, the numerous links between the IOC and CAS 
and gave the view that these links could potentially be of such significance to call into 
question the independence of CAS if the IOC should be one of the parties in the 
dispute.64 This is due to the fact that CAS’s operating costs were borne by the IOC, the 
IOC has the power to modify the CAS Statute and that the IOC and the president of the 
IOC had the power to choose 30 of the 60 arbitrators on the list of arbitrators of CAS.65 
 
4.3. CAS after the reform 
 
The Elmar Gundel judgement was the trigger for reforming the Court of 
Arbitration for Sports by firstly revising the CAS Statute, CAS Regulations and creating 
ICAS (International Council of Arbitration for Sport) to take over the duties from the 
IOC and seize control over financing and management activities. All of this making CAS 
more independent from IOC.  
 
The creation of ICAS meant that CAS would become more independent of the IOC 
because it would serve as a buffer between the relationship of CAS and IOC. The 
confidence in CAS would grow and the athlete’s rights would be safer if CAS was under 
the control of a different body whose sole goal was to facilitate the resolution of 
sports-related disputes and to be responsible for administration and financing.66 After 
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the statutory changes and the adoption of the new CAS Code of Sports-Related 
Arbitration which allowed CAS to be more independent from the IOC, CAS evolved 
constantly with the number of arbitrators growing to 300 (as in 2014) from the 60 
arbitrators in the 80’s, creating ad hoc arbitration divisions for specific events and the 
number of submitted cases exponentially growing.67  
 
Although the Swiss Federal Tribunal has upheld numerously that CAS is, in fact, a 
genuine and independent arbitral tribunal especially after the adoption of the new CAS 
Statute, a new case in another country turns the attention to these matters from a 
different perspective, the case of German professional speedskater Claudia Pechstein. 
The Pechstein case is specific because it covers a long legal battle that spanned for a 
decade in two different States (Switzerland and Germany) and finally ended at the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
 
The Pechstein case dealt with a number of issues (inter alia the arbitration agreement 
being void for breaching EU Competition Law and of the dominant position of sports 
federations compared to the athletes) but ultimately it ended with the main question 
of the independence of CAS as an institution from sporting federations. The ensuing 
structural changes in CAS have already occurred with the amendments to the CAS 
Code of Sports-Related Arbitration and further developments are to be under the 
direct influence of the Pechstein case.68 
 
4.4. CAS procedural rules governing organization of CAS, election of arbitrators, 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators 
 
The CAS is composed of more than 350 arbitrators (as of January 2020) that are 
organized by the Court Office and the Secretary General. The arbitrators work in three 
divisions, two of which were created after the reform of the CAS Code of Sports-
Related Arbitration in 1994 and one that started operating in 2019. The first two 
divisions consist of one Ordinary Division and one Appeal Division in order to 
distinguish disputes of the first instance that are a result of contract disputes or other 
acts that trigger the dispute, and disputes that are based on the challenge to decisions 
rendered by sporting associations or other sporting bodies to which decisions appeal is 
applicable. Both divisions are headed by a president that is in charge of procedure in 
the pre-procedural stage while the arbitrators are not still appointed. In addition, the 
division presidents can issue orders for interim relief if requested by the parties.  
 
The third division is the Anti-Doping Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport that 
has been established to hear and decide anti-doping cases as a first-instance authority 
pursuant to the delegation of powers from the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
International Federations of sports on the Olympic program (Olympic IFs), 
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International Testing Agency (ITA) and any other signatories to the World Anti-Doping 
Code (WADC). 
 
ICAS has the purpose of facilitating the resolution of sports-related disputes through 
arbitration or mediation and safeguarding the independence of CAS, the rights of the 
parties and it is also responsible for the administration and financing of CAS.  The 
composition, attributions and operation of ICAS is regulated by the CAS Code of 
Sports-Related Arbitration.69 
 
ICAS is designated with the power to elect individuals as arbitrators for a period of four 
years. The appointed personalities to the list of CAS arbitrators need to have 
appropriate legal training, recognized competence with regard to sports law and/or 
international arbitration, a good knowledge of sport in general and a good command 
of at least one CAS working language. The names and qualifications or potential CAS 
arbitrators are brought to the attention of ICAS by the IOC, the IFs, the NOCs and by 
the athletes’ commissions of the IOC, IFs and NOCs.70 
 
Independence and impartiality is a duty that every arbitrator has to obey according to 
article R33 of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration that allows no exceptions.  
 
“Every arbitrator shall be and remain impartial and independent of the 
parties and shall immediately disclose any circumstances which may affect 
her/his independence with respect to any of the parties.”71 
 
Apart from the duty of independence and impartiality a CAS arbitrator also needs to 
have a good command of the language of the arbitration and has the obligation to 
complete the arbitration expeditiously.72 These obligations are a part of a wider issue 
of integrity of CAS arbitrators that are outside the principles of independence and 
impartiality. The procedure for challenging and replacing an arbitrator is regulated by 
the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration in articles R34-R36 and the procedure for 
issuing of provisional and conservatory measures is regulated in article R37. 
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5. Specific issues of independence and impartiality in CAS Arbitration 
This subsection is divided into analyzing two legally separate but factually 
connected matters as a follow up on the issues discussed in the previous chapters. 
Firstly this subsection contains the analysis of the case law of CAS and SFT regarding 
the challenges to individual arbitrators, setting aside attempts of CAS’s arbitral Awards 
and the decisions thereto. Secondly, it contains an analysis of the Pechstein case, the 
questions of CAS’s status as a court of arbitration and the implications whether or not 
CAS has independence and impartiality as an institution from various sporting 
associations.  
 
5.1. Independence and impartiality of arbitrators as viewed by case law of CAS and 
SFT 
 
The Challenge Commission and ICAS are the competent bodies that deal with 
challenges on arbitrator’s independence and impartiality according to the CAS Code of 
Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 (the Challenge Commission has the discretion to refer 
a case to ICAS).73 ICAS has numerously repeated in its decisions that objective 
circumstances need to exist that give rise to justifiable doubts to an arbitrator’s 
independence (or impartiality) in order for his removal from a Panel.74 
 
“an arbitrator may be challenged […] if circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his independence“75 
 
As was emphasized earlier the imperative that an arbitrator was independent and 
impartial during the arbitral proceedings plays the key role for the credibility of the 
arbitral Award. An arbitration that fails to obey such important principles fails to be 
recognized as arbitration at all. The essence of arbitration proceedings is the integrity 
of the arbitrators. The same exists regarding the integrity of national judges and the 
credibility of their judgements in national court proceedings.  
 
The SFT as the competent national court in Switzerland has through its case law 
formed a standing on the topic of independence and impartiality of CAS arbitrators. 
The conclusion is that arbitrators, the same as national judges need to show sufficient 
guarantees of independence and impartiality on the basis of Article 30 of the Swiss 
Federal Constitution which proclaims that all disputes need to be solved by an 
independent and impartial court and if contrary the arbitral Award will not be 
enforceable in Switzerland.76 The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 
proclaims that CAS arbitrators shall be and remain impartial and independent of the 
parties, an obligation which CAS arbitrators appointed to a Panel commit themselves 
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to comply by signing a declaration of independence.77 Through this declaration, CAS 
arbitrators commit themselves to “exercise their functions personally with total 
objectivity, independence and impartiality, and in conformity with the provisions of this 
Code.”78 An issue in the past of CAS was the inability to challenge an arbitrator that 
was a CAS member when such a person acted as counsel to the parties in other cases 
before CAS, however, now the situation is not possible because of the 2010 modified 
CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration which prohibits arbitrators to act as counsel 
during their mandate in CAS.79 
 
As was mentioned in the chapter Independence and impartiality of arbitrators of this 
work (p. 3 and p. 5) the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law 1987 
proclaims that arbitrators need to be independent and is silent on the principle of 
impartiality.80 The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration was also silent regarding the 
principle of impartiality until 2013, following the example as in the Swiss PILA, when 
the CAS Code was revised and the principle of impartiality was added to the CAS 
code.81 
 
The next question is whether the President of the Panel has a higher standard of 
independence and impartiality than the party-appointed arbitrators that nominated 
him. Although the CAS Code does not contain a definition of independence and 
impartiality, regarding the position of the President of the Panel, the CAS and the SFT 
both agree that the same standard of independence and impartiality applies to all 
members of the Panel in CAS arbitration.82 
 
The case law of CAS regarding the challenges to an arbitrator’s independence and 
impartiality in sports arbitration follows the trends of the more renowned institutional 
arbitrations such as ICC Arbitration, LCIA etc. and follows the recommendations in the 
IBA Guidelines. The case law provides insight into how the Challenge Commission, ICAS 
and SFT stand regarding the criteria for removal of an arbitrator from the Panel. 
 
Such as in commercial arbitration, past professional relationships with a party to a 
dispute or the previous appointments into Panels by the same party, may cause 
reasonable doubt to the arbitrator’s independence only if there is an economic tie 
among them.83 It is only reasonable that challenges such as these should be rejected 
because the community of sports arbitration is a small and relatively closed circle. The 
CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 prohibits any other individual besides the 
individuals on the closed lists of CAS to be an arbitrator in its proceedings, therefore, 
the small number of sports law experts are bound to have some kind of professional or 
personal relationship among themselves and among lawyers that frequently appear in 
CAS arbitration. 
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In one doping case (the most frequent type of disputes before CAS) one of the 
arbitrators in the Panel was involved in the drafting of the World Anti-Doping Code 
(hereinafter: WADA Code) and one of the respondents in the dispute was the World 
Anti-Doping Agency. The Appellant cast doubts as to the arbitrator’s independence 
because of his previous engagement in the drafting of the WADA Code. The ICAS and 
the SFT concluded that the doubts to the independence of the arbitrator would have 
been an issue if the arbitration was taking place at the same time as the drafting of the 
WADA Code, however, given the fact that this was a previous engagement that has 
ended there were no more economic or emotional ties of the arbitrator to WADA and 
the Appellant’s appeal was rejected.84 
 
Sports arbitration is inevitably connected to sporting associations. Whether on the 
respondent side or the claimant side, one of the parties in sports arbitration is 
inevitably a sporting association (most often more sporting associations jointly). 
Sporting associations such as FIFA, UEFA or FIA have great influence in their sport and 
as such have the possibility to influence an arbitrator far more than an athlete in the 
dispute. This is why an arbitrator could be removed from a case if he is an official of 
the league in which the athlete took part and also if the arbitrator that was appointed 
by a respondent is an official of a national sporting association to which the 
respondent is an indirect member it suffices that the legitimate doubts to his 
independence exist.85 If the arbitration proceedings are led by a sole arbitrator that is 
an opponent of the party’s counsel in a civil procedure that does not have any 
connections to the present arbitration proceeding, in the absence of other facts it is 
insufficient to deem an arbitrator dependent or biased merely by being on the 
opposing side in a civil procedure.86 
 
An arbitrator’s articles or comments that were published in journals are evidence of 
potential bias if they show that he has already formed a view regarding the case at 
hand. Such behavior by an arbitrator could lead to him being removed from the Panel. 
However, articles or comments need to be a personal view of the case at hand. 
Publishing an article or book on sports law and certain problems in sports law that 
arise regularly or are a current topic in the professional discussions does not constitute 
a ground for removing an arbitrator.87 
 
The SFT has accepted as lawful a situation when an arbitrator was previously a 
member of a CAS Panel that confirmed a breach of contract, and afterwards, the same 
arbitrator is now a member of a Panel designated to deal with consequences of the 
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same breach of contract (even though this situation is in the Waivable Red List of the 
IBA Guidelines).88  
 
The parties to the dispute have to be active. They have to act promptly, investigate 
and challenge the arbitrator’s independence as soon as they find out that reasonable 
doubts exist. The SFT has upheld this „duty of curiosity“ on the side of the parties and 
concluded that the parties should raise a challenge immediately, pointing out that in 
case a party appoints an arbitrator frequently and if the opposing party’s counsel is a 
specialist of sports arbitration the „duty of curiosity“ is even more emphasized because 
the counsel is aware of the recurrent relationship of the arbitrator and the other party 
(the arbitrator in question was appointed more than seven times in a period of two 
years).89  
 
Regarding the nationality of the arbitrator, it is common practice that if the arbitration 
proceeding is led by a Panel of three arbitrators that the party-appointed arbitrators 
be of the same nationality as the parties that appointed them. The President of the 
Panel and a sole arbitrator are not forbidden by CAS Code to be the same nationality 
as one of the parties, therefore it is possible, however, this situation is generally 
avoided.90 
 
5.2. Independence and impartiality of CAS itself: The Pechstein case 
 
Unlike other institutional arbitrations, the Court of Arbitration for Sport has a 
specific issue that has been at the center of many setting aside attempts of its arbitral 
Awards. When a party to a dispute believes that an arbitral Award was rendered by a 
dependent or biased arbitrator or arbitral tribunal the setting aside attempt is directed 
at the specific arbitrators and only if there is a sufficient level of proof, with the burden 
of proof being on the party alleging that such circumstances exist. Another common 
condition is that the party had already unsuccessfully challenged the independence 
and impartiality of an arbitrator during the arbitral proceedings. CAS has a procedure 
for challenging individual arbitrators in its Statute.91 In CAS arbitration all arbitrators 
appointed to a case sign a declaration of independence through which they accept 
their duty to objectively and independently carry out their duties as arbitrators.92 
However, the issues that are specific to CAS arbitration are not on an individual 
arbitrator level but on an institutional level.  
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The question is whether CAS structurally is dependent on sporting federations such as 
the International Olympic Committee. These links to sporting federations make the 
question of the independence and impartiality of individual arbitrators pointless 
because the question arises whether CAS is capable of guaranteeing the minimum of 
rights to individuals in order to be an arbitral tribunal at all?  
 
Ms Claudia Pechstein is a German speed skater whose disciplines are 3,000 and 5,000 
meters, her results are admirable (nine Olympic medals, five of which are gold medals) 
and she is one of the greatest winter sports athletes of all time.93 Ms Pechstein’s legal 
battle began in 2009 after the International Skating Union (ISU), which is seated in 
Lausanne, Switzerland and governed under laws of Switzerland, suspended her for two 
years from competition for an anti-doping violation after which she submitted an 
appeal against that decision to CAS, according to the ISU Statute.94 The CAS rejected 
Ms Pechstein’s appeal and confirmed the two-year suspension. In the arbitral Award 
CAS briefly touched upon the question of jurisdiction concluding that the parties 
explicitly recognized the jurisdiction of CAS in their briefs and, more interestingly, the 
parties signed the Order of Procedure (which would later be one of the reasons why 
the SFT rejected Ms Pechstein’s setting aside attempt).95  
 
Unsatisfied with the arbitral Award of CAS, Ms Pechstein decided to change the venue 
and went to the Swiss Federal Tribunal with an attempt to set aside the arbitral Award 
claiming inter alia that the CAS itself lacks independence.96 The ground for challenging 
the independence of arbitrators is possible pursuant to article 190 (2)(a) of the Swiss 
Federal Statute on Private International Law (PILA) whereby an illegal composition of 
an arbitral tribunal is sufficient for challenging an arbitral Award. However, such an 
objection must be made immediately in accordance with the principle of good faith, 
otherwise, it is assumed that the right to invoke that ground for appeal is forfeited.97 
The SFT concluded that given the facts of the case, most importantly that Ms Pechstein 
herself accepted CAS and submitted an appeal to CAS and signed the Order of 
Procedure, it would be contrary to the principle of good faith to raise the issue of 
independence before the SFT as a public appeal under the PILA. The SFT rejected Ms 
Pechstein’s challenge.  
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Another ground for setting aside CAS’s arbitral Award was the alleged refusal of CAS to 
grant a public hearing to Ms Pechstein by not allowing her manager to be present 
during the hearings, contrary to her wishes.98 The SFT concluded that the right to a 
public hearing is not applicable to voluntary arbitration proceedings which are not 
public as a rule and rejected this ground also but surprisingly the court noted that 
given the significance of CAS arbitration in the world of professional sports it would be 
desirable for a public hearing to be held on the request of the athlete concerned even 
without the consent of all of the parties to the dispute.99 
 
By exhausting all legal remedies in Switzerland Ms Pechstein rather tenaciously 
continued her legal battle before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and in 
the courts of her country. In 2012 while the proceedings before the ECtHR were still 
pending she submitted a claim before the German Court (“LG München”) against DESG 
and ISU, suing them for damages that were a result of an unlawful doping ban in the 
amount of more than EUR 3.5 million.100  
 
The decision of LG München gained wide attention because the Court found that the 
arbitration agreement per se was invalid due to the monopolistic structure of ISU 
which did not give athletes a choice other than to sign the agreement, thereby lacking 
consent.101 However, the LG München dismissed the claim due to the res judicata 
effect of the CAS arbitral Award because Ms Pechstein neglected to challenge the 
arbitration agreement during the earlier stage in the arbitral proceedings.  
 
Ms Pechstein appealed the decision of the LG München before the Munich Court of 
Appeals (OLG München) which rendered a landmark interim judgment on January 
2015.102 The OLG München concentrated on the issue of the admissibility of Ms 
Pechsteins claim as to the arbitration agreement between her and ISU. The Court 
concluded the same as the LG München that the arbitration agreement is void 
however not because of a lack of consent of the athlete but because it is contrary to 
German Competition Law.103 In its judgment the OLG München was of the opinion that 
ISU has a monopoly in its relevant market (in the sport of ice speed skating) and it 
imposed an arbitration agreement on an athlete which is not unlawful per se given the 
specific roles of sports associations in the world of sports, however, the OLG München 
pointed at certain structural misbalance in the process of selection of arbitrators 
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before the CAS which altogether constitute a violation of Art. 19 of the German 
Competition Law.104  
 
OLG München concluded that the majority of arbitrators on the CAS closed lists are 
appointed by organizations of sporting associations. The OLG München, therefore, 
concluded that it has jurisdiction over Ms Pechstein’s claim and continued to address 
the effects of the CAS arbitral Award based on the void arbitration agreement by 
verifying the conditions for recognition and enforcement according to the New York 
Convention. According to German Law and art. V (2)(b) of the New York Convention 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral Award may be denied if it is contrary to 
public policy and, according to the OLG München, fundamental provisions of 
Competition Law fall within the scope of German public policy.105 The reasoning of the 
OLG München was that by imposing the arbitration agreement on Ms Pechstein, ISU 
abused its dominant position which is prohibited by German Competition Law, hence 
the CAS arbitral Award that upheld such an arbitration agreement could not be 
recognized and enforced in Germany.106 By denying res judicata effect of the CAS 
arbitral Award the German Courts are allowed to examine the facts of the case in the 
merits, making Ms Pechsteins case admissible in Germany. 
 
This judgment sent ‘shock waves’ through the world of sports arbitration.107 The 
decisions of both the LG München and OLG München were criticized by professional 
arbitrators related to the possible limits of reviewing a final and binding foreign 
arbitral Award by a domestic court.108 Finally, the legal saga of Ms Pecshtein ended 
with the judgement of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) in 2016.109 The BGH 
reversed the OLG München decision, confirming the independence and impartiality of 
the CAS and the validity of the arbitration agreement, rejecting the lower Courts view 
that the arbitration agreement was imposed by the abuse of a dominant position of a 
sporting association and that CAS has a structural misbalance to the detriment of 
athletes.110 
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5.3. The current status of CAS: Does CAS qualify as an institutional court of 
arbitration at all? 
 
At the center of the attention of many professional sports arbitration 
practitioners was defining the consequences of the interconnection of CAS with 
sporting associations, mostly the IOC which played a crucial role during the creation of 
CAS (see p. 17) and the consequences these connections could have on the status of 
CAS as a court of arbitration. The BGH ruling in the Pechstein case brought back the 
status quo in international sports arbitration (if it were otherwise the ruling would 
have had serious effects on international commercial arbitration also, most notably 
due to its conclusion relating to the validity of the incorporation-by-reference 
arbitration clause, which is used quite frequently in businesses worldwide) and the 
reactions to the decision of the BGH were divided, with some legal experts criticizing 
the BGH for taking the side of SFT and missing the opportunity to influence the CAS to 
instigate a new reform.111 
 
The epilogue of the Pechstein case was that CAS was, at one time during the post-
award phase, basically denied the status of a court of arbitration by a national court 
because of the inferior position of athletes in the pre-arbitration phase which 
cumulates with certain structural misbalance in the process of selection of arbitrators 
before CAS. The structural misbalance was caused because the sporting associations 
had more to say while the list of arbitrators of CAS was being formed. This did not per 
se cause the OLG München to deny CAS the status of a court of arbitration but in 
connection with other facts among which the incorporation-by-reference arbitration 
clause in sporting association’s statutes was the most important. The incorporation-by-
reference arbitration clause in sporting association’s statutes is forced upon athletes if 
they wish to join the sporting association and be a professional athlete.  
 
These two facts caused the OLG München to deny recognition and enforcement of the 
CAS arbitral Award in the Pechstein case because they suffice to be contrary to public 
policy and, according to the OLG München, fundamental provisions of Competition 
Law, which fall within the scope of German public policy. This means that even private 
law instruments such as statutes of sporting associations could have possible effects to 
the validity of a final arbitral Award in the post-award phase if they contain an 
arbitration clause and if the court of arbitration that rendered the arbitral Award had 
certain issues in its formation to the detriment of the “weaker” party.  
 
CAS has instigated a reform as a consequence of the aforementioned Pechstein case 
targeting the structural imperfections that seem to be a constant struggle for CAS since 
its foundation. The CAS believes that the closed lists of arbitrators should be kept 
because they are beneficial to everyone as they allow specialization in sports 
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arbitration and allow further evolution of lex sportiva through the individual quality of 
arbitrators. The target of the reforms should, therefore, be in the area of the election 
of arbitrators to the closed list of CAS so as to allow a more balanced representation of 
athletes. 
 
The steps that CAS has taken were the revision and elimination of the quotas for IOC 
and other sporting organizations which could suggest the nomination of arbitrators for 
the CAS closed lists of arbitrators (article S14 of the CAS Code of Sports-Related 
Arbitration that was examined the most by the OLG München).112 CAS has since 2012 
acknowledged that it would be beneficial if former professional athletes could be 
arbitrators and took measures to encourage and educate former athletes to be 
arbitrators before CAS. CAS also formed a legal aid fund for athletes that could not 
afford to finance a case before CAS in order to help them access justice in CAS. All 
these measures were taken with the goal of leveling the balance of power between 
sporting associations and individual athletes.  
 
Even though the BGH ruling in the Pechstein case brought back the status quo in CAS 
and reaffirmed that CAS is a genuine court of arbitration, further measures should be 
taken to clear out any potential danger that another national court might refuse 
recognition or enforcement of CAS’s arbitral Awards. 
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6. Conclusions 
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators in CAS and the status, the 
standards of proof, definitions and case law in sports arbitration per se is mostly 
similar to the practice of institutional arbitrations in commercial matters. The different 
decisions on challenges to independence and impartiality of arbitrators in certain cases 
before CAS come from the characteristics of the structure of CAS itself as an institution 
and not due to sports law as a specific area of law or different rules of procedure. 
Therefore, individually an arbitrator could be challenged for the same reasons as in any 
other arbitration proceeding. The outcomes of challenges are also similar to other 
commercial arbitration proceedings because they follow the best practice and 
recommendations that are codified in the IBA Guidelines. The IBA Guidelines allow for 
more legal certainty and they are applied frequently in sports arbitration if the 
opportunity exists. Also, the obligations of arbitrators in CAS are similar to those of any 
other institutional arbitration, with independence and impartiality being defined in 
article R34 of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2019 so as to allow flexibility 
to the Challenge Commission and ICAS when deciding on a challenge. 
 
There are two main reasons that forced a large number of athletes to challenge 
arbitral Awards of CAS. The first reason was an institutional and structural matter of 
CAS itself, the disproportionate power of arbitrator nomination to the CAS closed lists 
is what triggered set aside attempts because the athletes felt that they do not have a 
say when choosing an arbitrator. The second reason is that athletes before even 
starting an arbitration proceeding are in an unequal position with their sporting 
associations. They need to join a club or another sporting organization in order to play 
their sport and by joining they need to accept all terms and conditions of the clubs and 
sporting associations and it goes even further so as to be obliged to comply with the 
rules of higher instance international sporting associations which their clubs are 
directly or indirectly members of.  
 
According to many authors the BGH missed the opportunity in the Pechstein case to 
influence CAS to instigate a new reform and shed light on the problematic structural 
matters of CAS.113 Some even go as far as to say that the BGH ruling “could have had 
important systemic repercussions for arbitration in general, as it could jeopardise the 
legal certainty that arbitral awards made in Switzerland offer.“114 
 
In my opinion, the BGH ruling in the Pechstein case were it different and upheld the 
lower court’s decision to deny recognition and enforcement CAS’s arbitral Award, it 
would not have had the desired effects to change the whole concept of sports 
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arbitration. The reason is that the BGH ruling could have only been beneficial to 
German athletes because they could have, ideally, chosen to go directly to German 
national courts and surpass CAS which, from the aspect of German courts, would not 
have been considered a court of arbitration. The BGH could only consider the Award 
through German civil and competition law. Athletes from other countries could not 
avoid CAS because the status of CAS from the perspectives of other countries would 
not have changed.  
 
Another reason why an alternative ruling of BGH would have had minor global effects 
to CAS’s arbitral Awards is that the BGH examined the 2004 CAS Code of Sports-
Related Arbitration which was applicable back then. The effects of the BGH ruling 
would be bound to the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2004 which could be 
revised and the status quo would be inevitably restored again because any other 
subsequent case before a German court would have to go through the same review as 
in the Pechstein case, but now with a newly revised CAS Code that does not have the 
said issues. Even if the BGH ruled differently it should be kept in mind that these 
effects would be bound only to Germany because international sports arbitration is an 
imperfect necessity that has no alternatives at this moment and is universally accepted 
by all countries, a status that would not have changed.115 
 
The real question was: should foreign national courts examine a foreign arbitral Award 
with such thoroughness and way out the balance of power among the parties? This 
could arise the question whether or not an athlete as the “weaker” party should have 
more protection from national courts and would raise the possible limits of reviewing a 
final and binding foreign arbitral Award in the post-award phase, which is exactly 
opposite of what arbitration, in general, seeks to achieve. 
 
In the EU legal system disputes arising out of labour law are common, however 
mandatory labour law arbitration such as in the US is not allowed by public policy in a 
number of EU countries (e.g. France and the Netherlands). Unlike labour law, in sports 
law, mandatory arbitration is accepted. It is accepted even though professional 
athletes share many similarities to common workers, such as small bargaining power 
against their employer, they have salaries, training (working) hours, etc. Because of 
these characteristics, athletes feel like they are in an inferior position to sporting 
associations and even if they wish to seek court help, they are obliged to firstly rely on 
the mechanisms of dispute resolution that are incorporated in the statutes of their 
clubs and associations, without national court recourse. They are obliged to rely on a 
dispute resolution mechanism which is unfamiliar to them and they know as a fact that 
their club’s association, i.e. the opposing party in the dispute, has more practice in CAS 
arbitration which is why they assume that the small number of arbitrators will be in 
the latter’s favour through mutual acquaintance.  
 
None of the aforementioned circumstances alone are enough to deny enforcement of 
a final and binding arbitral Award, however, all of them together could raise the 
matter to be contrary to public policy and the lawfulness of the arbitration agreement. 
If the structural misbalances of CAS, or any other institutional arbitration, are to such 
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an extent to deny a potential party access to a lawful proceeding (among which being 
heard by an independent and impartial Panel of arbitrators is the condition sine qua 
non for a lawful proceeding) which is additionally aggregated by a multi-sided 
unfavourable factual background to the detriment of the “weaker” party, than the 
arbitration may be refused the status of arbitration completely.  
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